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''MADE IN ETHIOPIA'' -THE NEW NORM IN THE 
GARMENT INDUSTRY 
Marie Durane * 
Ethiopia is one of the fastest growing economies in the world, achieving enormous economic growth averaging 10.6% over the past decade and leading in Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI). 1 According to the 2014 United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Invest-
ment Report, FDI in Ethiopia has increased by 242% from 2012 
to 2013.2 However, the excessive speed at which Ethiopia is 
seeking foreign investment into the country, specifically in the 
garment industry, has led to an exploitation of garment workers 
who are paid extremely low wages. To ensure garment workers 
are paid fairly, Ethiopia should establish a minimum wage law 
that reflects an amount that Ethiopians can actually live on. 
Ethiopia is on its way to becoming the "China of Africa" 
of the garment industry. 3 Over the past few years, the rising 
cost of doing business in China has incentivized manufactur-
ing businesses, specifically clothing and textile companies, to 
look for cheaper alternatives in African countries.4 Ethiopia is 
attractive to foreign investors because it is an untapped resource, 
known as "one of the last remaining unindustrialized frontiers."5 
Furthermore, Ethiopia boasts a business-friendly environment, 
political stability, low energy cost, raw materials, Jack of tariffs, 
and a great deal of cheap labor.6 
However, Ethiopia lacks minimum wage laws. 7 While the 
country has labor laws, which reflect international standards of 
labor, the law does not establish a set minimum wage except in 
the domestic industry. 8 Wages are generally set by employers 
or by a contract agreement between employer and employee;9 
meaning that Ethiopians in the textile and clothing industry 
will have to make due with whatever wages they are given or 
risk having no income at all. 10 In fact, this is exactly what has 
occurred: Ethiopia now holds the title for the lowest paid gar-
ment workers in the world. 11 Entry-level salary for an Ethiopian 
factory worker is estimated to be between $35 to $45 per month, 
considerably lower than workers paid in China, $629 a month, 
and Bangladesh, $68 a month. 12 These low wages are likely due 
to the fact that unlike many developing countries, Ethiopia has 
an unparalleled comparative advantage. Not only can it offer 
foreign investors an abundance of labor, but it can also offer 
foreign investors the ability to set their own wages. 
While Ethiopia is under no legal obligation to establish a 
minimum wage law, the International Labour Organization 
("ILO"), of which Ethiopia is a member, encourages its mem-
bers to adopt minimum wage laws in accordance with the 
1970 Minimum Wage Fixing Convention No. 131. 13 However, 
Ethiopia has chosen not to ratify this Convention, arguing 
that instead of setting a rigid minimum wage to address the 
unemployment in the country, it has created policies to attract 
foreign investment, which in turn will aid in unemployment. 14 
The government of Ethiopia argues that ratifying Convention 
131 could be detrimental to employment, which is why it 
advocates for more flexibility in wages rather than creating a 
rigid national minimum wage. 15 The Ethiopian government's 
rationale is flawed. For young workers, who make up the bulk 
of factory workers in Ethiopia, setting a minimum wage would 
reduce unemployment. 16 In a study of 31 countries during the 
mid-1990s in North Africa, Sub- Saharan Africa, Latin America 
and Asia, higher minimum wages were shown to have a positive 
effect on poverty by lowering the poverty rate. 17 Comparatively, 
the employment rate remained unchanged when the minimum 
wage levels were increased. With Ethiopia aggressively pursuing 
the textile and clothing industry, a national minimum wage is 
essential to protect garment workers from further exploitation of 
being denied a livable wage. 18 Therefore, Ethiopia must estab-
lish a minimum wage law that reflects an amount sufficient to 
provide food, shelter, education, and socialization. 
While Ethiopia has made considerable gains in reducing 
poverty and increasing economic growth, sustainable economic 
growth requires the protection of its citizens' rights to a livable 
wage. The next shirt you purchase at a nominal price may say 
"Made in Ethiopia," 19 but your economic gain should not come 
at the expense of protecting the right of factory workers to earn 
livable wages. ~) 
*JD Candidate 2017, American University Washington College of Law 
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